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This essay explores the richness of the Portu-
guese microdata provide for the characterisation
of the job creation and destruction processes, and
for the analysis of the transitions that occur in the
Portuguese labour market(1).
For a long while the general understanding of
the functioning of labour markets assumed a
strong inertia in employment’s adjustment to
shocks in the demand of final goods. The image
that prevailed in economic research, based on ag-
gregate empirical information, conveyed a gradual
and smooth behaviour of the economic aggregates
describing the labour market.
However, over the course of the last two de-
cades, the growing use empirical researchers in
the field of Labour Economics made of microeco-
nomic databases — i.e., those electing the worker
and/or the firm as the unit of observation — al-
lowed to change radically the former perception of
the labour market dynamics.
Behind the apparent smoothness conveyed by
aggregate data, recent research based on
microdata brought into light a picture of unex-
pected turbulence and of a very dynamic labour
market functioning.
However, it should be stressed that the shift in
the perception of the intensity of labour market
flows largely preceded the current discussion
around the effects on the labour market brought
by international trade intensification and “globali-
sation”. Moreover, academics do not associate the
idea of strong employment volatility to a recent
trend characterising the economies, but consider it
a structural phenomenon that characterises the la-
bour market functioning already for quite a long
time. Nevertheless, it is debatable whether em-
ployment volatility (job precariousness or instabil-
ity) has worsened recently. Empirical evidence
available for the United States of America, how-
ever, does not confirm the existence of a sustained
increasing trend in job volatility (see Wanner and
Neumark, 1999).
In this context, legislation on job protection in
the Portuguese case is particularly important. The
present analysis will suggest that this legal frame-
work influences decisively labour adjustment
costs, thus influencing the nature of the labour
market itself. Therefore, stress shall be laid on the
impact of firing costs on the intensity of flows of
workers and on the equilibrium level of the unem-
ployment rate. Although fixed-term contracted
workers account for not more than 15 per cent of
wage earners, this category absorbs more than half
of employment adjustments. Therefore, we shall
analyse the role of labour contracting regulation
on employment dynamics and on workers’ wage
developments.
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* The opinions of this paper represent the views of the author,
they are not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal.
** Economic Research Department.
(1) The Banco de Portugal thanks the Instituto Nacional de Estatística
for having made available individual records of the Employ-
ment Survey, and the Statistics Department of the Ministério do
Emprego e Solidariedade for the microdata of the Quadros de
Pessoal.2. JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION IN
PORTUGAL
A conventional manner of carrying out a bro-
ken-down characterisation of job dynamics is to
measure job flows. Taking the firm (or the estab-
lishment) as the reference unit, the measurement
of job creation sums the number of jobs created
due to the birth of new firms and the number of
jobs created by the expansion of existing ones.
Conversely, a measure of job destruction sums the
counting of jobs foregone due to firm close-ups
and jobs destroyed due to employment reduction
in labouring firms. Therefore, four different situa-
tions account for the size of job flows: expansion,
contraction, entries and exists of establishments.
In Portugal, labour market flows measured an-
nually show a similar intensity to those of other
OECDS economies (OECD, 1996)(2). According to
the information collected from the individual re-
cords of the Quadros de Pessoal, in the period run-
ning from 1983 up to 1995, job destruction in man-
ufacturing industry (in the economy as a whole)
amounted annually to around 11.8 per cent (13.7
per cent) of existing jobs. On the other hand, in
manufacturing industry (in the economy as a
whole) 11.4 per cent (14.9 per cent) of total jobs
were newly created jobs (see table 1). Jobs de-
stroyed are broken-down into virtually even
shares of plant closings (5.5 per cent for manufac-
turing and 6.4 per cent for the economy as a
whole) and contraction of employment (6.3 per
cent and 7.3 per cent, respectively). In turn, jobs
created are also due, in basically equal parts, to the
opening of new establishments (5.3 per cent for
manufacturing industry and 7.8 per cent for the
economy as a whole) and the expansion of existing
plants (6.1 per cent and 7.1 per cent).
It is interesting to notice that in Portugal, as in
other economies, the bulk of job creation and job
destruction takes place within the same activity
sector or the same region, even when considering
sectors and regions at a high breakdown level
(Carneiro and Portugal, 1998). Indeed, employ-
ment flows are basically due to the expansion and
contraction of employment and to the closing and
opening of plants within the same sector and re-
gion, and not to phenomena of sectoral recompo-
sition or regional displacement: while around 84
per cent (86 per cent) of employment flows are
within sector (intra-regional), only 16 per cent (14
per cent) are due to inter-sectoral (inter-regional)
changes (Carneiro and Portugal, 1998). Also in line
with the empirical evidence available for other
economies, job turnover drops sharply according
to plant size (table 2).
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Table 1
ANNUAL JOB FLOWS (1983 - 1994)














Manufacturing industry ......... 0.053 0.061 0.114 0.055 0.063 0.118 0.232
Total economy.................. 0.078 0.071 0.149 0.064 0.073 0.137 0.286
Source: Blanchard and Portugal (1999).
Notes:
(A) Ratio between the number of jobs created as a result of the entry of new establishments into activity and total employment.
(B) Ratio between the number of jobs created as a result of the expansion of existing establishments and total employment.
(C) Ratio between the number of jobs destroyed as a result of the closing of establishments and total employment.
(D) Ratio between the number of jobs destroyed as a result of the contraction of existing establishments and total employment.
(2) Job flows are calculated from the net job changes occurred in a
given establishment between March of one year and March of
the following year.However, the relative importance of plant mo-
bility in the distribution of job flows appears as a
distinctive feature of the Portuguese labour mar-
ket, which may be related with the influence job
protection legislation on labour demand. This
means that the reason behind the strong intensity
of job flows due to plant creation and destruction
(10.8 per cent — 5.3 plus 5.5 — for manufacturing
industry and 14.2 per cent — 7.8 plus 6.4 — for the
economy as a whole, see table 1) when compared
with the flow generated by plant contraction and
expansion (12.4 per cent and 14.4 per cent) may be
the high firing costs enforced by labour legislation
(Blanchard and Portugal, 1998).
Another distinctive feature of the Portuguese
labour market is the low intensity of quarterly em-
ployment flows, when compared with the corre-
sponding annual flows (table 3)(3). The natural in-
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / December 1999 51
Articles
Table 2
JOB FLOWS, MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1983 – 1994))








1 to 19 workers .................... 0.128 0.105 0.086 0.070
2 0t o4 9........................... 0.069 0.076 0.076 0.060
5 0t o9 9........................... 0.047 0.064 0.065 0.058
1 0 0t o2 4 9......................... 0.034 0.050 0.058 0.060
2 5 0t o4 9 9......................... 0.030 0.045 0.046 0.055
5 0 0t o9 9 9......................... 0.016 0.028 0.032 0.050
1000 to 2499....................... 0.004 0.013 0.036 0.053
2500 to 4999....................... 0.000 0.032 0.013 0.060
5000 + ............................ 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.083
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, calculations made by the author.
Notes:
(A) Ratio between the number of jobs created as a result of the entry of new establishments into activity and total employment.
(B) Ratio between the number of jobs created as a result of the expansion of existing establishments and total employment.
(C) Ratio between the number of jobs destroyed as a result of the closing of establishments and total employment.
(D) Ratio between the number of jobs destroyed as a result of the contraction of existing establishments and total employment.
Table 3
QUARTERLY JOB FLOWS (1983 – 1994)














Manufacturing industry ....... 0.012 0.020 0.032 0.010 0.029 0.039 0.071
Total economy ............... 0.018 0.022 0.040 0.011 0.028 0.039 0.079
Source: Blanchard e Portugal (1999).
Notes:
(A) Ratio between the number of jobs created as a result of the entry of new establishments into activity and total employment.
(B) Ratio between the number of jobs created as a result of the expansion of existing establishments and total employment.
(C) Ratio between the number of jobs destroyed as a result of the closing of establishments and total employment.
(D) Ratio between the number of jobs destroyed as a result of the contraction of existing establishments and total employment.terpretation for the low magnitude of quarterly
employment flows is that Portuguese firms do not
change significantly their demand for labour in the
presence of transitory shocks, contrary to their re-
action vis-à-vis shocks that are perceived as being
of a permanent nature. Therefore, the observation
of a strong persistence of job creation and destruc-
tion (i.e., hiring and firing decisions that are not
reversed afterwards) (see table 4) is interpreted as
resulting from the difficulty in reacting to tempo-
rary shocks, which in turn reflects the impact of
high costs of adjustment to workers’ departure.
3. WORKER FLOWS
The concept of worker flow is closely linked to
the phenomenon of job creation and destruction
by firms, and is distinct from the concept of job
flows. To ascertain this, one only needs to consider
a situation where more than one worker may, in a
given period of time, rotate by the same job. The
inflow of workers comprises total hired workers,
while conversely the outflow encompasses all
ways in which workers become unattached from
firms (firings, retirements, quits etc.). Therefore,
the intensity of worker flows reflects their mobil-
ity.
The Portuguese labour market is characterised
by a very low labour mobility (see table 5). Obvi-
ously, a low intensity of job creation and destruc-
tion is sufficient to explain weak labour mobility
(or worker turnover). However, even when condi-
tioned to job creation and destruction, workforce
rotation is low in Portugal. For each job created or
destroyed only 1.5 workers rotate (around 60 per
cent of the level obtained for the EUA) (table 5).
The low labour mobility is reflected in a range
of indicators that allow to characterise the Portu-
guese labour market as one of the less (if not the
least) dynamic (i.e., most stable) in the OECD.
Both the average number of jobs over the working
life and the average job tenure give a picture of
immobility (see table 6). The same message is con-
veyed by the proportion of long-term jobs (lasting
over 20 years) and by the rate of transition from
employment into unemployment, out of labour
force or into another job (see table 6). In fact, the
rate of transition form employment into unem-
ployment is the lowest in the OECD.
These indications result not only from the weak
job turnover but also form the weak incidence of
voluntary exits (quits), which are discouraged in the
Portuguese labour market by the perspectives of a
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Table 4





1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 1 year
1991 ...... 0.763 0.583 0.454 0.356
1992 ...... 0.757 0.556 0.436 0.347
1993 ...... 0.737 0.549 0.451 0.388
1994 ...... 0.731 0.590 0.488 0.408
Average. . . 0.747 0.569 0.457 0.375
Job destruction
Persistence rate after:
1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 1 year
1991 ...... 0.839 0.726 0.626 0.576
1992 ...... 0.850 0.737 0.647 0.588
1993 ...... 0.875 0.766 0.645 0.579
1994 ...... 0.869 0.769 0.659 0.602
Average. . . 0.858 0.749 0.644 0.586
Source:”Inquérito ao Emprego Estruturado”, calculations made by
the author.
Note: The rate of persistence is an indicator of the proportion of
jobs created (destroyed) maintained in the following pe-
riods.
(3) It should be noted that this sum of quarterly job flows neces-
sarily exceeds annual job flows, since annual flows are ob-
tained from the net change in employment between two
periods of time, separated one year from each other, while
quarterly flows count the net changes employment records in
a given quarter — i.e., the net changes in employment that
take place in a given quarter, but are reversed in following
quarters, and are hence do not appear in the annual job flows.long-lasting unemployment experience. Meanwhile,
the hypothesis of switching jobs directly, with no
unemployment or non-participation episode in be-
tween, does not appear to be relatively more inten-
sively used than the former. Thus, the weak rate of
employment-unemployment transition is not com-
pensated by a higher employment-employment
transition rate.
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Table 5
ANNUALISED WORKER AND JOB FLOWS
(1), ESTABLISHMENTS IN BUSINESS
(2)
Expansion Contraction Hirings Separations
(A) (B) (C) (D) (C+D)/(A+B)
1991 .................. 0.102 0.115 0.177 0.188 1.682
1992 .................. 0.099 0.124 0.162 0.186 1.556
1993 .................. 0.080 0.131 0.126 0.176 1.434
1994 .................. 0.084 0.117 0.128 0.159 1.424
1995 .................. 0.083 0.104 0.129 0.148 1.476
Average............... 0.090 0.118 0.144 0.171 1.517
Source:” Inquérito ao Emprego Estruturado”, calculations made by the author.
Notes:
(1) Annual figures result from accumulating quarterly flows.
(2) Entries and exits of establishments are not included.
(A) Ratio between the number of jobs created as a result of the expansion of existing establishments and total employment.
(B) Ratio between the number of jobs destroyed as a result of the contraction of existing establishments and total employment.
(C) The rate of hirings is given by the ratio between the number of workers that, in a given year, decide to enter the establishment and total
employment.















In months Proportion Proportion Average Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion
1993 ........ 151.7 12.5 23.8 2.6 37.1 0.95 1.14 1.41
1994 ........ 149.9 11.6 23.3 2.8 34.0 1.10 1.02 1.19
1995 ........ 147.7 11.9 23.5 2.8 31.8 0.80 0.93 1.09
1996 ........ 148.2 12.6 24.2 2.8 30.3 0.84 0.94 1.28
Average..... 149.0 12.1 23.7 2.8 32.7 0.92 0.99 1.20
Source: Microdata from the “Employment Survey” (INE), employed population, calculations made by the author.
Note: Proportions were calculated with reference to total employment.4. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND WORKER
FLOWS
The interpretation of job and worker flows in
Portugal cannot be separated from the legal frame-
work of job contracts. Portuguese legislation,
which constitutionally consecrates the principle of
job stability (article 53º of the Portuguese Constitu-
tion), establishes significant constraints on worker
firings. These constraints are provided not only by
the regulatory framework of severance pay and of
the job contract forms, but also — and most nota-
bly from an economic point of view — by the exis-
tence of an imprecate and lasting set of procedures
and mechanisms which the process of firing must
observe(4).
In the presence of non-returnable firing costs
(for instance, administrative costs, cost of execu-
tion of the social plan, costs due to production
disrupture resulting from the announcement of
collective lay-offs) economic theory predicts
clearly the effects of job protection on employment
flows: the greater the firing costs, the smaller shall
be employment outflows (the lower shall be fir-
ings). If ex-ante a non-zero probability of the firm
suffering a negative shock to the demand for the
product exists, a rise in firing costs rises the mini-
mum productivity threshold required to create a
new job (or, from another perspective, the free en-
try condition lowers the maximum wage at which
the employer is willing to pay the worker).
Furthermore, job protection strengthens the
bargaining power of workers, whom therefore are
in conditions to demand a higher wage level.
Therefore, at an initial stage, firing costs lead to a
gap between the wage offered by the employer
(the feasible wage) and the wage demanded by the
worker (the bargaining wage). To re-establish
equilibrium in the labour market, unemployment
penalisation will tend to rise through the reduc-
tion of job offers, which in turn rises the duration
of an unemployment spell.
According to alternative references and meth-
odologies, the Portuguese legislation on job pro-
tection is considered the most restrictive in the
OECD. The most widely used indicator is com-
piled by the OECD and is based on the systematic
comparison of job protection legislation in its
member states (see table 7)(5). However, this indi-
cator is not exempt from criticism. In addition to
the difficulties that are always present in any com-
parative law exercise, a quantified measure of the
level of rigidity of labour legislation is inevitably
proneness to some subjectivity and, most notably,
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(4) From the viewpoint of economic theory, the relevant firing
costs (i.e., the costs that effectively condition employers’ labour
demand decisions) are those that are not bound to become inef-
fective through the redesign of adequately conceived new con-
tract (Lazear, 1990). For instance, in case of severance pay, the
worker may offer inter alia the employer a monetary compen-
sation (a bond) to pay for the right to the indemnity.
(5) This indicator is based on a weighted index of the degree of le-
gal constraints included in the legislation on severance pay for
dismissal, collective lay-offs, individual firing, temporary work
and dismissal notice. Other indicators based on surveys to em-
ployers lead to similar rankings.
Table 7
RANKING OF COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THE
DEGREE OF JOB PROTECTION




























Source: OECD, 1999.it cannot assess the degree of effectiveness of
(compliance with) legal rules. However, there is
no solid ground on which countries could be dif-
ferentiated according to the degree of compliance
with the respective legal frameworks.
The characterisation of worker flows allows to
classify the Portuguese labour market as the para-
digmatic case of the influence job protection can
yield on the labour market dynamics. As referred
above, this indication is clearly reflected both in
the worker mobility indicators (average job dura-
tion, average number of jobs, intensity of labour
force flows between employment, unemployment
and non-participation) and in the high average un-
employment duration.
5. JOB SECURITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT
The high levels and the strong persistence of
unemployment in Europe, contrasting with the
United States of America, gave rise to an intense
discussion over the last decade on the role of the
labour market institutions on unemployment de-
velopments (Nickell, 1997). More specifically, re-
searches on the influence of the unemployment se-
curity system, the legal framework of job con-
tracts, the training system and active labour mar-
ket policies on the unemployment rate were devel-
oped(6).
More specifically, the analysis of the effects of
job protection (conditioning firings, regulating job
contracts, etc) on the levels of the unemployment
rate have risen sharp controversy(7).
At the theoretical level, higher firing costs tend
to give rise to lower inflows into unemployment
and longer unemployment average duration. Since
firing costs affect unemployment flows and dura-
tion in opposite directions, the expected effect of
these costs on unemployment rates is ambiguous.
At the empirical level, namely in research carried
out based on international comparisons, the corre-
lation between indicators of the degree of rigidity
of job protection legislation and the unemploy-
ment rate is very week, if not nill. On the contrary,
a strong sample correlation is found between the
level of job protection and average unemployment
duration, and also between the level of job protec-
tion and intensity of entries into unemployment
(Blanchard and Portugal, 1999).
The comparison of the Portuguese case with
that of other economies is particularly revealing.
Indeed, when Portugal is compared with the USA
(a country unanimously considered as one of those
that least imposes constraints to firings), one can
observe that both countries exhibited similar un-
employment rates over the course of the last fif-
teen years. However, average unemployment du-
ration in Portugal is three times higher than in the
USA, which is compensated with flows into unem-
ployment more than three times smaller. This sug-
gests that job protection changes the nature of the
labour market, making economies more sclerotic,
and generating potential productivity and welfare
losses.
In this context, the comparison between the
Portuguese and the Spanish labour markets is also
quite suggestive. Though exhibiting very similar
job protection legal frameworks(8), the Spanish
economy exhibits unemployment rates that are
more than three times higher than in Portugal
(Bover, Garcia-Perea and Portugal, 1999). This in-
dicator suggests that the explanation for the para-
doxical behaviour of the Spanish and Portuguese
labour markets does not stem from job protection.
Instead, it must be due to other institutions. A pos-
sible influence may be the system of unemploy-
ment subsidies, virtually non-existing in Portugal
until 1985 (Blanchard and Jimeno, 1995). However,
the current design of the Portuguese unemploy-
ment subsidy system does not differ substantially
from the Spanish one(9). A more plausible explana-
tion is advanced in Bover, Garcia-Perea and Portu-
gal (1999), based on the difference in the bargain-
ing power of unions in both countries. For this
purpose, these authors characterise the forms of
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(6) More recently, some researches have tackled the issue of the in-
teraction between labour market institutions in the accommo-
dation to economic shocks (Bertola and Rogerson, 1997;
Blanchard and Wolfers, 1999).
(7) This controversy is particularly evident in the political debate,
since the main conclusions gather general consensus among re-
searchers.
(8) Different job protection indicators consistently show that Por-
tugal, Spain and Italy are the economies that show the highest
protection indices.
(9) Nevertheless, one may argue that the impact of unemployment
subsidy systems is felt only in the presence of very strong eco-
nomic shocks to labour demand. This shall not have been the
case of Portugal since the generalisation of the unemployment
subsidy system.union representation in both countries and collect
a set of empirical data on the indirect manifesta-
tion of bargaining power (wage dispersion, strikes,
wage differentials between insiders and outsiders,
real wage flexibility, etc), which point towards a
strong bargaining power of Spanish syndicates
when compared with those in Portugal. Indeed,
unions representation rules in Spain are such that
syndicates reflect especially the interest of em-
ployed workers (the insiders), while in Portugal
representation appears to be more diversified and
decentralised, contributing to greater wage flexi-
bility.
Finally, it should be stressed that the true eco-
nomic costs associated with job protection do not
translate into the increase of unemployment levels,
but instead into potential production and welfare
losses. According to the calibration trials of
Blanchard and Portugal (1999), these losses are
quite significant.
6. JOB FLEXIBILITY AND FIXED-TERM
CONTRACTS
In some European countries characterised by
particularly rigid labour legislation, mechanisms
of flexibilisation of labour contracts were intro-
duced over the last decades. These aim at easing
labour market adjustments and reducing unem-
ployment. The most paradigmatic case is that of
the introduction of fixed-term contracting. How-
ever, the explosion of fixed-term contracts in the
hiring of workers did not always yield the ex-
pected results (Bentolita and Dolado, 1994). In
some cases, the growing use made of fixed-term
contracts seems to have increased the labour mar-
ket segmentation between insiders and outsiders,
increasing unemployment (Blanchard and Sum-
mer, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). Moreover,
the massive resort to temporary contracting
(Alba-Ramirez, 1998), by giving rise to strong
worker turnover by different jobs, creates less fa-
vourable conditions to investment in specific hu-
man capital, thus affecting productivity and
wages.
6.1 The importance of fixed-term contracts
In Portugal, fixed-term contracts were intro-
duced in the second half of the 1970s, as an at-
tempt to alleviate the difficulties in job matching
associated with an excessively rigid job protection
framework. With the flexibilisation of lay-offs in
1989, more constraints were laid on fixed-term
contracting. In the current legal framework,
fixed-term contracts have a relatively limited share
in total wage earners’ contracts (see chart 1). How-
ever, these contracts represent around 60 per cent
of total hirings and 50 per cent of total separations
(see chart 2) (Varejão, 1998). Therefore, fixed-term
contracting plays a key role in the process of la-
bour adjustment.
Indeed, while a fixed-term contracted worker
faces a 4.7 per cent (3.05 per cent) probability of
entering unemployment (non-participation) with-
in a quarter, for a open-ended-contracted worker
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Chart 2
INCIDENCE OF FIXED-TERM CONTRACTS




0 1 22 43 64 86 0
Job tenure (in months)the probability of becoming unemployed (a
non-participant) is 0.6 per cent (0.8 per cent) (see
tables 8 and 9, and chart 3). However, the proba-
bility of a fixed-term contracted worker becoming
permanently contracted (5.45 per cent, see table 8)
is higher than the risk of unemployment (chart 4).
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / December 1999 57
Articles
Table 8












1992 ...... 3.41 3.62 0.45 5.03 16.77
1993 ...... 5.29 3.83 0.91 7.20 19.64
1994 ...... 6.31 3.01 0.67 3.74 5.98 3.67 19.18
1995 ...... 4.53 2.45 0.66 3.45 4.81 3.66 17.17
1996 ...... 4.43 2.85 0.45 4.02 4.59 3.51 15.37
1997 ...... 3.92 2.72 0.34 4.14 4.99 3.38 16.51
Average. . . 4.70 3.05 0.58 3.84 5.45 3.56 17.05
Source: Microdata from the “Employment Survey” (INE), computations made by the author.
Table 9













1992 ...... 0.44 0.78 0.21 0.24 129.43
1993 ...... 0.68 1.10 0.29 0.30 138.83
1994 ...... 0.78 0.85 0.18 0.87 0.24 2.70 141.43
1995 ...... 0.59 0.70 0.20 0.83 0.29 2.70 141.30
1996 ...... 0.61 0.72 0.22 1.01 0.34 2.69 143.50
1997 ...... 0.51 0.74 0.17 1.01 0.41 2.69 143.23
Average. . . 0.61 0.82 0.21 0.93 0.30 2.69 142.36
Source: Microdata from the “Employment Survey” (INE), computations made by the author.
Chart 3
QUARTERLY RATES OF TRANSITIONS INTO
UNEMPLOYMENT OR OUT OF LABOUR FORCE
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Job tenure (in months)It now seems clear that the resort to this con-
tractual form has a behaviour markedly adjusted
with the economic cycle. Since fixed-term con-
tracts have lower adjustment costs than perma-
nent contracts, it is quite natural that the former
are used more intensively in the upper swing of
the economic cycle, being fixed-term contracted
workers the first to be fired when economic activ-
ity slows down (Varejão and Portugal, 1999).
6.2 Why firms use fixed-term contracting
Several motives lead firms to resort to
fixed-term contracting. Economic activities subject
to greater demand variability, whether due to sea-
sonal reasons (the case of tourism) or to the nature
of the product (construction, for example), will
tend to resort to fixed-term contracts more inten-
sively. Thus temporary contracts perform as “buff-
ers” against shocks to the demand of the product.
Fixed-term contracts usually also perform as
mechanisms of selection of workers; in cases the
workers attributes match the job characteristics,
this form gives place to a permanent contract. In
this case, temporary contracting functions mainly
as an “entry door” into the labour market.
6.3 Who are fixed-term workers
The use of temporary contracts, in addition to
affecting job stability, may influence the process of
accumulation of human capital specific to the job.
If this contract form is used mainly to select and
test workers, then it provides an improved alloca-
tion of resources, without influencing perma-
nently individuals’ productive abilities. On the
contrary, the persistence of a temporary contract
situation over the life cycle tends to generate inad-
equate investment in specific training, therefore
feeding situation of labour market segmentation.
The characterisation of wage earners according
to the respective contract form seems to indicate
that in Portugal it is principally youngsters at the
beginning of their work life who feed the stock of
temporarily-contracted workers (table 10, chart 5).
Given individuals’ observed attributes, the labour
situation of fixed-term contracted workers does
not depress significantly their wage income (the
loss is estimated at 3 per cent when comparing
with permanently-contracted workers’ wages). (ta-
ble 4). However, if the temporary contract situa-
tion persists chronically over the age of thirty, the
results of the estimation of the wage equation with
parameters varying according to age indicate that
wage losses will tend to be very high (chart 6).
Therefore, the fringe of adult workers that keeps
permanently rotating through temporary jobs will
raise an income which is much lower than the one
earned by permanently-contracted workers. This
situation reflects, with a great likelihood, the ab-
sence of a return to investment in specific training.
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Chart 5



























Age (in years)................... 38.6 29.8
Schooling (in years).............. 7.1 7.5
Male (proportion) ............... 55.1 49.3
Number of jobs.................. 2.7 3.5
Job tenure (in months) ........... 143.2 20.8
Part-time (proportion)............ 3.6 7.4
Married (proportion)............. 72.7 47.6
Source: Microdata from the "Employment Survey" of the INE, cal-
culations made by the author.7. CONCLUSIONS
Job protection legislation in Portugal is consid-
ered the most restrictive in the OECD. This per-
ception is based on international comparisons,
which are necessarily subject to many limitations
and ambiguity. However, the indication of strong
legal protection of jobs is consistent with the styl-
ised facts on the Portuguese labour market devel-
oped in this article. Therefore, employment protec-
tion legislation seems to influence decisively em-
ployment adjustment, reducing the intensity of job
creation and destruction flows and lowering
worker turnover. Most notably, job flows com-
piled on a quarterly basis — as to avoid problems
related with time aggregation — revealed the im-
portance of the costs of adjustment of jobs to em-
ployment dynamics.
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Table 11




Total Open-ended Fixed-term contract




2 ...................................... -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00003)
Basic schooling (1st cycle).......................... 0.0958 0.1101 0.0003
(0.0095) (0.0102) (0.0256)
Basic schooling (2nd and 3rd cycle) ................. 0.3052 0.3249 0.1239
(0.0100) (0.0108) (0.0267)
Secondary schooling .............................. 0.5932 0.6352 0.2952
(0.0113) (0.0122) (0.0290)
Upper-level schooling............................. 1.1119 1.1456 0.816
(0.0114) (0.0122) (0.0303)
Training job tenure ............................... 0.1178 0.1306 0.043
(0.0079) (0.0087) (0.0183)
Job tenure ....................................... 0.0127 0.0121 0.0234
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0049)
Tenure
2......................................... -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0007
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00038)
Male ............................................ 0.2264 0.2313 0.1996
(0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0105)
Fixed-term contract ............................... -0.0309
(0.0063)
Constant ........................................ 3.5068 3.4342 3.8926
(0.0154) (0.0169) (0.0348)
Sigma ........................................... 0.3205 0.3196 0.3067
N............................................... 31573 24300 4273
Log-likelihood ................................... -58131.5 -49042.7 -8873.6
Notes
(a) The estimation method used takes into account the aggregated nature of data on wages.
(b) The regression equation also includes 6 sectoral dummy variables.
(c) Asymptotic standard error.
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Open-ended contractThe obvious explanation for the weak magni-
tude of quarterly job flows is that Portuguese
firms do not change significantly labour demand
in the presence of transitory shocks, contrary to
what occurs when shocks are perceived as having
a permanent nature. Meanwhile, job protection
legislation appears to influence the mobility of es-
tablishments, yielding strong rates of entry and
exit of establishments. It is possible that in situa-
tions where it is needed to shrink worker force,
and adjustment costs are high, firms rather discon-
tinue activity instead of reducing partly the num-
ber of jobs.
Higher firing costs tend to give rise to smaller
flows into unemployment and longer average un-
employment duration. Since firing costs affect un-
employment flows and duration in opposite direc-
tions, their impact on the unemployment rate is am-
biguous. In this regard, a comparison of the Portu-
guese labour market with the ones of Spain and the
USA is particularly revealing. Although Portugal
and Spain have quite similar job protection legal
frameworks, the Spanish economy present unem-
ployment levels three times higher than in Portugal.
Meanwhile, when comparing Portugal with the
USA — we may observe that both countries exhib-
ited similar unemployment rates over the last 15
years. Therefore, it would appear that firing costs do
not influence the unemployment level. Economic
costs associated with job protection should instead
be measured by productivity and welfare losses
caused by the restrictions to firing.
Although accounting for less than 15 per cent
of total wage earners, fixed-term contracts absorb
more than half of worker adjustments. In Portugal,
fixed-term contracting are used especially as a de-
vice to select and test workers at an early stage of
their work life, to ensure a good matching of the
job characteristics with the worker’s skills. This
way of using temporary contracting does not seem
to penalise significantly workers’ wage income.
However, empirical evidence suggests that a
fringe of workers is found in a chronic situation of
temporary contracting. In this case, the disincen-
tive to investment in specific training stemming
from the limited duration of jobs seems to give rise
to quite significant wage income losses and may
originate segmentation in the labour market.
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